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WHOM MAY THE CORPORATION SERVE?AN ARGUMENT FOR THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
NON-STOCKHOLDER CONSTITUENCY STATUTES
I. INTRODUCTION

Non-stockholder constituency statutes are a new and judicially untested
feature of the corporation laws of a majority of the states. ' These statutes
permit, or in a few jurisdictions require,' the directors and/or officers of
domestically-chartered corporations to consider the interests of

constituencies other than the corporation's stockholders in some or all
business contexts.' By changing the permissible sphere of action, if not

the mandate, of corporate directors, the statutes might seem to disturb
stockholders' traditional expectations that the corporation will consistently

act to maximize their returns. For this reason, the question arises whether
the statutes could be attacked on federal constitutional grounds.

For

example, do constituency statutes impermissibly impair the obligations of
1. At present, 28 states have constituency statutes. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 101202 (Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1994); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (1989);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35(b) (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1602, 1702 (Supp.
1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, § 8.85 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-135-1(d), (f) & (g) (Burns 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.101B (West 1991); KY. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12:92(G) (West Supp. 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1993);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d) (Supp. 1994); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (Vernon 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035(1)(0) (1991); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:6-1(2), 6-14(4) (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-1135(D) (Michie Supp. 1992); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (MeKinney Supp. 1994);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5)
(1993); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715 (Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8
(1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-33-4 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-35-204
(1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 1992); WYO. STAT. § 17-16-830(e) (1994).
2. Most of the statutes are permissive, but some are mandatory. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (requiring directors to consider interests of nonstockholder constituencies in change-of-control situations); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1602,
1702 (same).
3. Most of the statutes implicitly apply to decisions in any context. Some, however,
apply only in contexts where control of the corporation may change. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.347.
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Or do they constitute state takings of private property that

would be forbidden except upon the payment of just compensation?5
Following a discussion of the context of the debate over constituency
statutes in Part W16 and a categorization of the relevant types of
constituency statutes in Part III,' the remainder of this note examines both
of these constitutional issues. Part IV analyzes whether constituency

statutes violate the Contracts Clause,8 and Part V performs a similar

analysis under the Takings Clause.9 Part VI concludes, based on current
jurisprudence, that constituency statutes are not constitutionally assailable
under either clause."0
II. CONTEXT OF THE DEBATE

Constituency statutes were passed by state legislatures during the

corporate takeover boom of the 1980s.11 They were often motivated by
the desire to protect domestic corporations from hostile changes of
control.1
By redefining the acceptable scope of corporate activity, the
4. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall ... pass any... Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts .... ").
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation."). This provision of the Fifth Amendment is applicable
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago,
B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (requirement that just compensation be
paid); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896) (requirement that taking be
for public use).
6. See infra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 29-116 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 117-205 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part VI.
11. For contemporary coverage of the takeover phenomenon see Bruce Nussbaum
& Judith H. Dobrzynski, The Battle for CorporateControl, Bus. WK., May 18, 1987,
at 102.
12. See David Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of CorporationLaw?, 45
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 903, 904 (1988) ("While state takeover legislation often pays lip
service to shareholder welfare, such legislation actually has a different purpose, a
purpose fundamentally antithetical to the shareholder primacy norm of present
corporation law."). On the provenance of state antitakeover legislation, see Edward F.

Greene, Regulatory and Legislative Responses to Takeover Activity in the 1980s: The
United States and Europe, 69 Tx. L. REV. 1539, 1556-65 (1991).
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statutes challenge the traditional understanding that
13 the corporation's

overriding goal is stockholder wealth maximization.

The popularity of the statutes-among other, larger concerns that

emerged in the aftermath of the takeover boom-has prompted
commentators to note an impending revival of the debate that occurred in

the 1930s over the proper role of the corporation in society.14 Indeed,
the frequent changes of corporate ownership in the 1980s provided new
impetus for those who would reconceptualize the corporation along
explicitly communitarian lines." Proposals such as the one Ralph Nader
made in the mid-1970's that corporations be required to appoint
"constituency directors" to safeguard the interests of all groups affected

by corporate activities-including customers, employees, suppliers, and the
local and national communities 1 6 -received a significant boost from
passage of the statutes.
By the same token, the potential for change that constituency statutes

pose has elicited a call for caution in how they are applied and interpreted.
The Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association, for

example, has remarked that careful study and principled public debate
13. As one scholar has noted, "stockholder wealth" is but one of several ways of
describing one thing, others being: the corporation's net present value, shareholder
wealth, the value of the corporation's shares, or, simply, profits. ROBERT C. CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW § 16.2.1, at 678 (1986). The common denominator is the amount left
over after all of the corporation's obligations are met. See id.
While state corporation statutes do not explicitly define wealth maximization as the
purpose of the corporate enterprise, courts have often assumed it to be so. See id. at
677-78.
14. See, e.g., A.A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The
Berle-DoddDebateRevisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33 (1991). In the
aftermath of the Depression, Professors Adolf A. Berle of Columbia Law School and E.
Merrick Dodd of Harvard debated the proper goals of corporate activity in the pages of
the HarvardLaw Review. Dodd advocated that corporations act immediately to promote
social, as well as private, ends. Berle countered that until a coherent enforcement
scheme could be developed for such a program, corporations should focus solely on
making profits for stockholders. Id. at 36-39. See A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom
CorporateManagersAre Trustees:A Note, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1365 (1932); A.A. Berle,
Jr., CorporatePowers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick

Dodd, Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of the FiduciaryDuties of Corporate Managers
Practicable?,2 U. CIn. L. REv. 194 (1934); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are
CorporateManagers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
15. See, e.g., David Millon, Redefining CorporateLaw, 24 IND. L. REV. 223
(1991).
16. RALPH NADER ET AL., TAmiNG THE GIANT CoRPORATIoN 118-22 (1976).
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should take place before state measures are employed
to effect
17
fundamental changes in a matter of such societal concern.
As of 1991, only two courts had issued opinions citing state
constituency statutes.18 Both cases, however, cited the statutes only as
alternative grounds for holdings based on state case law.'
Indeed,
because most constituency statutes apply to takeover situations either
expressly or by legislative design,' the recent softening of the corporate
takeover market suggests that judicial treatment of these statutes will be
further postponed. In the meantime, the debate suggested by the
American Bar Association can go forward.
Researchers and
commentators will enjoy an opportunity to construct an interpretive
apparatus that courts might profitably employ if and when those courts
decide cases that hinge on the statutes.
Im. CATEGORIZATION OF CONSTITUENCY STATUTES

Constituency statutes fall into three basic categories. In the first type,
an example of which has been enacted in New York," the state
empowers corporate directors not only to look to the long-term interests
of the corporations in their decision making, but also to consider the
impact upon any of several enumerated constituencies.'z Designated
constituencies include the corporation's current and retired employees,
customers, creditors, and even the local communities in which the
17. American Bar Association, Committee on CorporateLaws, Other Constituencies
Statutes: Potentialfor Confusion, 45 Bus. LAw. 2253 (1990).
18. Amanda Acquisitions Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1009
(E.D. Wrs. 1989); Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690, 697 (E.D. Pa.
1986).
19. See Amanda, 708 F. Supp. at 1009; Baron, 646 F. Supp. at 696.
20. See Millon, supranote 12, at 904.
21. N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 717(b). The pertinent part of the statute states:
In taking action, . . . a director shall be entitled to consider, without
limitation, (1) both the long-term and the short-term interests of the
corporation and its shareholders and (2) the effects that the corporation's
actions may have in the short-term or in the long-term upon...
(i) the prospects for potential growth...
(ii) the corporation's current employees;
(iii) the corporation's retired employees...
(iv) the corporation's customers and creditors; and
(v) the ability of the corporation to... contribute to the communities in
which it does business.
Id.
22. See id.
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corporation does business.'
Jurisdictions with constituency statutes
similar to that of New York include Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, and Wisconsin.'
In the
second type, enacted only in Indiana and Pennsylvania,' corporate
directors are, as in the New York-style statutes, encouraged to consider
the corporation's long-term well-being as well as the good of various
constituencies. In addition, however, these "Indiana-style" statutes specify
explicitly that directors need not place stockholder interests above those

of any other constituency.'

The Indiana law states that "[i]n making

23. Id.
24. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1602, 1702; ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 805, § 8.85; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.251(5); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035(1)(c); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-1135(D); OiHO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827.
25. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1. The statute reads, in pertinent part:
(d) A director may, in considering the best interests of a
corporation, consider the effects of any action on shareholders,
employees, suppliers, and customers of the corporation, and
communities in which offices or other facilities of the corporation are
located, and any other factors the director considers pertinent.
... In making such determination [whether a proposed action is in
the corporation's best interests], directors are not required to consider the
effects of a proposed corporate action on any particular corporate constituent
group or interest as a dominant or controlling factor.
Id.; 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715. The pertinent part of the statute reads:
(a) General rule.-In discharging the duties of their respective positions,
the board of directors, committees of the board and individual directors of a
business corporation may, in considering the best interests of the corporation,
consider to the extent they deem appropriate:
(1) The effects of any action upon any or all groups affected by
such action, including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers
and creditors of the corporation, and upon communities in which
offices or other establishments of the corporation are located.
(2) The short-term and long-term interests of the corporation.

(b) Consideration of interests and factors.-The board of directors,
committees of the board and individual directors shall not be required, in
considering the best interests of the corporation or the effects of any action,
to regard any corporate interest or the interests of any particular group affected
by such action as a dominant or controlling interest or factor.
Id.
26. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(f); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(b).
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[the] determination [whether a proposed action is in the corporation's best
interests], directors are not required to consider the effects of a proposed
corporate action on any particularcorporate constituent group or interest
as a dominant or controlling factor."' The third type includes statutes
that apply in special contexts, such as Connecticut's change-of-control
provision."
IV. IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS BY CONSTITUENCY STATUTES

The constitutionality of constituency statutes will be a crucial issue in
the formation of the interpretive apparatus mentioned in Part 1I. This
section will examine whether, under the jurisprudence that has grown
around the Contracts Clause of the Constitution, constituency statutes
could withstand a challenge based on this Clause.
The Contracts Clause provides that "[n]o state shall . . . pass any.
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.""
Unlike the Takings
Clause,' the Contracts Clause is an explicit constraint on state
government. 1 The Contracts Clause had its origin in the desire to
prevent state interference in one type of private contract, namely, state
laws granting partial or total forgiveness of private debts.32 It has,
however, been applied to other kinds of contracts, including those
involving the state as a party ("public" contracts) 3 and those between
private parties.'
In the early part of the nineteenth century, the
27.
28.
29.
30.

IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(0 (emphasis added).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; see infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
31. However, similarly to how the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause has
been held to make the Fifth Amendment stricture against takings for public use without
just compensation applicable to the states, see supranote 5, the Fifth Amendment's due
process clause has been held to make applicable to the national government the
prohibition against impairment of contracts found in Article I, § 10. See Lynch v.
United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
32. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 11.8, at
395 (4th ed. 1991).
33. See, e.g., Fletcher v.Peek, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (enjoining the State
of Georgia from annulling a land grant); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (holding that the terms of a prior royal grant prohibited
New Hampshire from altering the composition of the College's board of trustees).
34. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934)
(upholding Minnesota mortgage moratorium law against challenge by mortgagee who,
pursuant to the statute, was barred from foreclosing on mortgagor).
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Contracts Clause was widely used as a check on state power, 35 prompting
one observer to deem it "the bulwark of American individualism against
democratic impatience and socialistic fantasy." 36 With the rise of
substantive due process, however, the Contracts Clause fell into
comparative disuse as a check on state regulation of private economic
ordering." By the time substantive due process itself fell out of favor
with the Court,38 the Contracts Clause had been significantly stripped of
much of its power. Indeed, the Court's validation of a Depression-era
Minnesota mortgage moratorium law against a Contracts Clause challenge
in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell3 seemingly removed
even debtor relief laws from the Clause's purview.'
Recent cases,
however, suggest that the Clause is not a dead letter in American law.4 1
Part A of this section examines the history of the Contracts Clause
in more detail and delineates the essential doctrines on which a
constitutionality analysis depend. 42 The remaining parts of the section
work with this material. Part B examines whether the relationship among
stockholders, directors, and the corporation can properly be characterized
as a contract under the Clause.' Assuming that it can, Part C examines
whether constituency statutes impair that contract." Part D discusses the
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to employ in determining whether the
impairment is of constitutional dimension.' Finally, Part E concludes
that constituency statutes would not be found unconstitutional under the
Contracts Clause.'
35. GERALD GuNTHER, CONSTuTTONAL LAW 478 (12th ed. 1991).
36. Id. at 479 n.7 (quoting SIR HENRY MAINE, POPULAR GovERNMENT 248
(1886)).
37. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978).
38. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
39. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). The Court upheld the Minnesota law as an emergency
exercise of the state's police power. See id. at 444-48. The case is often cited as
heralding the dramatic expansion of the police power in the modem era. See, e.g.,
GEOFFREY R. STONE r AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1555 (2d ed. 1991).
40. Indeed, even Chief Justice Hughes, the author of the majority opinion in
Blaisdell, conceded that the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium was the type of law that
the Contracts Clause had been designed to forestall. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 427-28.
41. See infra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 47-83 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
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A. History of the Contracts Clause
Despite its explicit language, the Contracts Clause never has been held
to forbid all state impairments of contracts.47 For example, in Ogden v.
Saunders," the Court held that the Clause does not apply to state laws
that have a purely prospective effect."' In fact, during the nineteenth
century, when it was most often invoked with respect to state grants of
corporate charters, -' the Clause frequently was found to provide no barrier
against states' enactment of limitations on previously granted charters.
Thus, in Providence Bank v. Billings,"1 the Court declined to hold that
immunity from state taxation had been implied by the grant of a bank
charter.52 Similarly, in Stone v. Mississippi,5" the Court ruled that a
state-chartered lottery was not exempt from a later law outlawing
lotteries.'
By the early twentieth century, the Court considered
"settled" the fact that "neither the 'contract' clause nor the 'due process'
clause has the effect of overriding the power of the State to establish all
regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good
order, comfort, or general welfare of the community .... "I
The states' inherent powers were the focus of the Court's decision in
Blaisdell. The issue in that case was the constitutionality of a Minnesota
emergency relief law that empowered local courts to extend the statutory
redemption period in mortgage foreclosure situations. 56 The Court
affirmed the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court upholding the Act
as an emergency device. 57 Pointing to the need "for a rational
compromise between individual rights and public welfare,"s the Court
stated that the states' police power could be exercised in preventing the
literal enforcement of contractual obligations where "vital interests of the
47. See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 190 (1983) ("This Court has long
recognized that a statute does not violate the Contract Clause simply because it has the
effect of restricting, or even barring altogether, the performance of duties created by
contracts entered into prior to its enactment.").
48. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
49. See id.at 271-92 (separate opinion by Johnson, J.).
50. GUNTHER, supra note 35, at 479.
51. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830).
52. See id. at 564-65.
53. 101 U.S. 814 (1880).
54. See id. at 821.
55. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914).
56. See 290 U.S. 398, 415-18.
57. Id.at 447-48.
58. Id.at 442.
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community"5 9 were threatened.'
The Court reasoned that henceforth
"the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power [would be] read
into contracts as a postulate of the legal order."61
In the forty years following Blaisdell, the Court invalidated only two
state statutes on the basis of the Contracts Clause.62 A pair of cases in
the late 1970s, however, indicated that the Clause still had teeth. In
United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey,' the Court
invalidated a New Jersey enactment retroactively repealing a covenant
between New Jersey and New York limiting the ability of the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey to subsidize rail passenger
transportation from revenues pledged as security for bonds issued by the
Port Authority.'
Ruling that "contracts are not subject to unlimited
modification" under Blaisdell's reserved power,' the Court held that the
repealer was not necessary, inasmuch as a less drastic modification would
have permitted the state to encourage use of mass transportation.' Nor
was the repealer reasonable, inasmuch as the proffered rationale, the need
for mass transportation in the New York City area, was known at the time
of the original covenant.67 Accordingly, the Court held the repealer was
an unconstitutional impairment of the obligations of the contract.68
One year later, the Court further extended the revival of the Contracts
Clause. At issue in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus 9 was a
Minnesota law that subjected employers who terminated pension plans to
special charges if, upon termination, the plans could not pay the full
pensions of employees who had worked ten years or more. 0 In Allied
Structural, the plaintiff-employer had allocated just enough money to
cover the obligations of its existing plan based on actuarial predictions
(under which employee pensions vested after fifteen years of service)
when the plaintiff-employer decided to terminate its plan and close its
59. Id. at 439.
60. See id. at 439-40.
61. Id.at 435.
62. Richard G. Taranto, Note, A Process-OrientedApproachto the ContractClause,
89 YALE L.J. 1623, 1623 & n.7 (1980).
63. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See id. at 28-32.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 31-32.
See id. at 32.
438 U.S. 234 (1978).

70. See id. at 238.
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Minnesota office.7" Upon notification that it owed $185,000 in special
charges under the statute, the company sued for injunctive relief in federal
court, claiming the statute unconstitutionally impaired its existing
obligations to employees.'
Reversing the district court, the Supreme Court held that the statute
violated the Contracts Clause. 3 Because the statute "nullifie[d] express
terms of the company's contractual obligations and impose[d] a completely
unexpected liability in potentially disabling amounts,"' the Court found
the impairment to be both substantial and severe.75 Furthermore,
because the law was focused extremely narrowly on only those Minnesota
employers who had existing pension plans and who thereafter chose to
leave the state,76 the law did not even purport to be necessary to meet an
important general social problem, such as had been the case with the law
at issue in Blaisdell.' Therefore, given the severity of the effect on the
plaintiff, the law unconstitutionally impaired the obligations of plaintiff's
contracts with its employees. 78
U.S. Trust and Allied Structural represent prominent instances in
which the Contracts Clause has been used to invalidate state action
impairing existing contracts. More recently, however, the Court has
indicated a movement back toward deference to state legislative
determination. 9 In Energy Reserves Group, Inc., v. Kansas Power &
Light Co.,' for example, the Court upheld a Kansas statute precluding
gas suppliers from taking advantage of liberalized national price ceilings
for natural gas."1 The Court found that the Kansas law did not impair
existing contracts because both parties were operating in a heavily
regulated industry; therefore, at the time of contract formation, the
plaintiff had been on notice that gas prices could be subject to the vagaries
of both state and national regulation.'
The Court found that the means
chosen-to protect Kansans from gas price escalation were not "deficient,
71. See id. at 236-41.
72. Id. at 239-40.
73. See id. at 250-51.
74. Id. at 247.
75. See id. at 245-46.
76. See id. at 248, 250.

77. Id. at 248-50.
78. See id. at 250-51.

79. See GUNTHER, supra note 35, at 488.
80. 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
81. See id. at 416-21.
82. See id. at 413-415, 416.
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particularly in light of the deference to which the Kansas Legislature's
judgment is entitled. " ' Thus, in Energy Reserves, the Court signalled
its return to a more deferential stance.
13. Relationship Among Corporate Partiesas a Contract
Before the Court will analyze constituency statutes under the Contracts
Clause, it must be convinced that a "contract" exists."
Whether
corporations represent contractual relationships in and of themselves (i.e.,
above and beyond the contracts to which they are parties), of course, is
the central question. A modem trend among corporate-aw scholars is to
conceptualize the corporation as a "nexus" of contracts among
stockholders, directors, managers, employees, suppliers, and other
groups.es Under one account,
[s]hareholders, creditors and others enter into these contracts
when they invest, whether or not they individually negotiate
contract terms. Under the contractual theory of the corporation,
state corporation statutes-like the Uniform Partnership Act and
the Uniform Commercial Code-enforce corporate contracts,
reduce the costs of private contracting by creating standard
corporate forms that the parties can opt into, and provide central
notice to potential creditors that the firm has adopted limited

liabilty.

Ironically, the nexus theory echoes a conclusion that the Court
reached more than 170 years ago in Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward.Y In that case, Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for the
Court, characterized the college's charter as "a contract, on the faith of
which, real and personal estate has been conveyed to the corporation [such
83. Id. at 418.
84. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,244 (1978) ("In applying
[the] principles [that have emerged from the Court's recent Contracts Clause
jurisprudence], the first inquiry must be whether the state law has, in fact, operated as
a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.") (footnote omitted).
85. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, The Corporate
Contract, in THE ECONOMIC STRucrURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991); Henry N.
Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEo. MASON U. L. REV. 99
(1989).
86. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the
Corporation,55 BROOK. L. REv. 767, 770 (1989).
87. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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that] it is a contract within the letter of the constitution." s8 But, whereas
the modem trend is to view the corporation as a private contract (for
which the state, through its incorporation laws, merely furnishes standard
forms89), the theory advanced in Dartmouth College was that the
corporation is a type of public contract."° In Chief Justice Marshall's
words,

[a] corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature
of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its
creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its
very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to
effect the object for which it was created. 9
Inasmuch as Chief Justice Marshall's understanding was recently cited
with approval,' the modem Court probably would agree that the
corporation is a form of public contract. As discussed below, however,
the implications of this view for a Contracts Clause analysis are radically
different from those advanced by modern theorists.'
C. Impairment
Assuming the corporation to be a contract for purposes of the
Contracts Clause, the next question is whether state laws altering the scope
of lirectors' duties impair that contract. That question must be answered
in the negative. In a purely formal sense, constituency statutes do not
impair the corporate contract because an implied term of state
incorporation laws is that the state may amend the provisions of those laws
at any time.' Thus, investors may be said to have a general expectation,
prior to buying into a corporation, that changes in the state's corporation
laws may later alter their particular expectations for the contract. 95 This
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 643-44.
See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 86, at 770.
See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636-39.
Id. at 636.
See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 89-90 (1987).
See infra notes 94-116 and accompanying text.

94. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 (1991) (providing for free amendment
or repealer of the state's corporation laws at the pleasure of the state legislature).
95. ( . Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 (1934) ("Not
only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the
parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
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"background" law thereby becomes part of those stockholders' "contract"

with the corporation.'
State judicial law decisions furnish similar "background" law that
would be part of stockholders' contracts with the corporation.'
As
discussed below in the context of Takings Clause analysis, even without
constituency statutes, state case law already enables corporate directors to
have some regard for the interests of non-stockholder constituencies.9" As
discussed in Part V.B.1., directorial action that weighs concerns other
than stockholder wealth maximization does not disturb the reasonable
expectations of stockholders, which are crucial to the finding of a
compensable taking.Y
For the same reason, such action would not
impair the stockholder-corporation contract, because the possibility of
such action was part of that contract from the start.

Even without the "background" of either statutory reserved-power
terms or existing precedent specifically sanctioning consideration of nonstockholder groups, it is doubtful that constituency statutes would impair
the corporate contract. It would not be predictable with any degree of
certainty that corporations that do consider the interests of non-stockholder
constituencies would generate any less profits than those that do not.
Thus, whether stockholders suffered any real harm would be called into
question.
contracts as a postulate of the legal order.").
96. For an argument that the Contracts Clause should thwart such an implied power,
see Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CmH. L.
REV. 703 (1984). Epstein argues that the Clause should be used to prohibit both
retroactive and prospective state impairments of contracts:
To assume ... that all private contracts are entered into subject to a "master
term" whereby they incorporate both present and future positive rules is a way
to annihilate the clause, not to interpret it. Suppose, for example, the state
passed a law which read in full: "Any private contract entered into after the
passage of this statute shall be subject to abrogation or modification by
subsequent legislation." The statute would be but a transparent attempt to
claim for the state power that the Constitution removes from it, and could not
withstand serious constitutional scrutiny.
Id. at 727.
97. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 429-30 ("This Court has said that 'the laws which
subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract, and where it is to be
performed, enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or
incorporated in its terms.'") (quoting Von Hoffnan v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
535, 550 (1866)).
98. See infra notes 172-205 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 163-98 and accompanying text.
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The few commentators who have considered the impairment issue as
it relates to constituency statutes have strained in their efforts to
demonstrate that the statutes constitute an impairment."° For example,
Butler and Ribstein, while aelmowledging that the case law tolerating
directorial consideration of non-stockholder groups may be regarded as
having been incorporated into the stockholder-corporation contract,
nonetheless assert that "on balance the statutes . . . seem to impair the
corporate contract." 1 1 They reason that "[s]ince shareholders would not
willingly accept these terms, they should be subjected to them only by
clear prospective regulation.""~
However, Butler and Ribstein offer
no support for these alleged stockholder preferences. Moreover, good
grounds exist to believe that stockholders, because they willingly buy into
the corporation against both of the backgrounds discussed above, do
accept the terms.
D. Scrutiny Level
The Court has indicated that state actions impairing contracts will be
evaluated according to varying levels of scrutiny in determining whether
impairment, if it exists, is of constitutional dimension, and hence
proscribable. 11 First, the level of scrutiny will vary with the degree of
impairment, being stricter where the impairment is more substantial. 1
Because, as discussed,10 5 constituency statutes cause little if any
impairment of the corporate contract, courts would be likely to evaluate
them using a less strict, or relaxed, level of scrutiny.
Second, scrutiny will be more strict if the state impairs the obligations
of a contract to which it is a party-that is, if the contract involved is a
public, rather than a private, contract. "° In order to pass constitutional
muster, the state statute must be "reasonable and necessary to serve an
100. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supranote 86.
101. Id. at 799.
102. Id.
103. See United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1977).
104. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1978):
The severity of the impairment measures the height of the hurdle the state
legislation must clear. Minimal alteration of contractual obligations may end
the inquiry at its first stage. Severe impairment, on the other hand, will push
the inquiry to a careful examination of the nature and purpose of the state
legislation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
105. See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
106. See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25-26.
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important public purpose. " °7
' Because the Court would likely agree that
state incorporation laws-to the extent that they can be characterized as a

contract at all, represent a contract to which the state is a party' 8 this
factor would, in theory, militate for stricter scrutiny.

Higher scrutiny for contracts to which the state is a party, however,
is warranted only when the state has attempted to contract away an

essential attribute of its sovereignty." °

Indeed, though the state may

bind itself to financial contracts," such powers as the police power and

the power of eminent domain cannot be contracted away.'

Therefore,

because the states have broad police powers that can justify impairment of

contractual obligations"--and because the states have exercised those
powers to reserve to themselves the ability to amend corporate

charters"'-courts would be likely, on balance, to apply relaxed scrutiny
to constituency statutes.
E. Constituency Statutes as Pernissible Impairments
Because the Court would be likely to impose a relaxed level of

4
scrutiny on the state purposes behind corporate constituency statutes,"

such statutes would probably be found constitutional under the Contracts

Clause. Under a relaxed standard, the Court would be likely to credit
legislators' justification for the statutes as promoting the common
good." 5' While constituency statutes have come under heavy criticism
107. Id. at 26. The rationale is that:
complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity
is not appropriate [where] the State's self-interest is at stake. A governmental
entity can always find a use for extra money, especially when taxes do not
have to be raised. If a State could reduce its financial obligations whenever
it wanted to spend the money for what it regarded as an important public
purpose, the Contract Clause would provide no protection at all.

Id. (footnote omitted).
108. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 23 & n.20, 24 & n.21 (citations omitted).
See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434-35 (1934).

113. See supranote 94 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
115. See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 22-23. The Court wrote:
Legislation adjusting the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties must
be upon reasonable conditions and of a character appropriate to the public
purpose justifying its adoption. As is customary in reviewing economic and
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for being inefficient tools to promote that good,11 6 there is room for
honest disagreement, and the Court would simply accord the benefit of the
doubt to legislatures.
V. CONSTITUENCY STATUTES AS COMPENSABLE STATE TAKINGS

The Takings Clause raises additional questions regarding the
constitutionality of constituency statutes. This Clause reads, in pertinent
part: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." 1 7 The Clause is part of the Fifth Amendment and was
originally designed to limit only the national government. 1 ' At the end
of the last century, however, the Supreme Court, in two decisions, ruled
that the Clause applies against the states as well. 1
The historical
origins of the Clause are sketchy, but it is generally thought that it was
designed to ensure that the public itself, rather than the private individual
whose property was taken, pay for the benefit thereby acquired."2 With
or without compensation, a taking is prohibited altogether under the
Clause if the taking is not for a public use."' Traditionally, the Clause
has concerned takings of land and other tangible property, but at times the
Court has extended the Clause to other forms of property."
Accordingly, the threshold issue for this section, considered in Part A, is
whether the interest of a stockholder in the corporation can appropriately
be deemed a property interest in the context of the Clause."
Part B
examines whether corporate constituency statutes constitute a "taking" of
property and, thus, are more than merely regulatory."
If the statutes
social legislation, however, courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to
the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure.
Id.(citations omitted).
116. See, e.g., Walter Werner, Corporation Law in Search of Its Future, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1611, 1664-65 (1981).
117. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
118. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 32, § 11.11, at 425-26.
119. See supra note 5.
120. Armstrongv. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (The Clause is "designed
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."); STONE, supra note 41,
at 1565.
121. STONE, supra note 39, at 1567.
122. See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 140-205 and accompanying text.
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are found to constitute a taking, then a cause of action against the state is
implied, either to enjoin their enforcement on the grounds that they do not

serve a public purpose, 125 or to force the state to compensate the
stockholder for her loss. 126

A. Shares of Stock as Property
A stockholder's ownership stake in a corporation has long been held
to constitute property under the common law."2 For the purposes of the
Takings Clause, however, the Court would not obviously so hold,

especially because most cases considered under the Clause have concerned
state actions impinging on real property." Indeed, in United States v.
General Motors Corp.," the Supreme Court went so far as to define
property for takings purposes as "the group of rights inhering in the
citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and

dispose of it." 30
The language of General Motors, however, suggests a basis for

finding that the stockholder's interest constitutes property for Takings
Clause purposes. While stock certificates themselves are not tangible
property, what the stockholder owns in a substantive sense is nevertheless

an interest in tangible property, namely, the right to possess his share of
that which, if anything, remains of the corporation's assets once all of the

corporation's liabilities are satisfied."'

The fact that upon liquidation,

the stockholder would have a right to cash proceeds, rather than actual
125. See 27 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 486 (1966) (describing the availability
of injunctions against improper takings).
126. Such an action to force the state to compensate the stockholder might be
brought in the context of a so-called "inverse condemnation" suit, which has been
characterized as an action "initiated by the property owner rather than the condemnor.
. . where private property has been actually taken for public use without formal
condemnation proceedings and where it appears that there is no intention or willingness
of the taker to bring such proceedings." Id.
127. E.g., Cruising World, Inc. v. Westermeyer, 351 So. 2d 371, 373 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1978); In re Greenleaf, 56 N.E. 295,
295 (IUl. 1900); Registrar & Transfer Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 398 A.2d 1335,
1338 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 81 N.J. 63 (1979).
128. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992)
(coastal acreage); Yeev. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (mobile home park);
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (beachfront property).
129. 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
130. Id. at 378 (emphasis added).
131. See Lvis D. SOLOMON BT AL., CoRPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 172 (3d
ed. 1994).
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physical property, is irrelevant because the stockholder in this situation is

in the same position as a secured creditor (who, the Court has held, has
a property interest in the Takings Clause context). Similarly, such
intangible rights as liens 3 and nonpurchase-money mortgages'34 have
merited Takings Clause analyses by the Court. In addition, recent cases

support the idea that interests in cash and in realty constitute property
under the Takings Clause. For example, in Connolly v. Pension Benefit

Guaranty Corp.,1 the Supreme Court agreed that the imposition of
liability on employers for pension fund withdrawals created a "real
debt" 1 ' and137necessitated an analysis of whether the regulation amounted
to a taking.

While a stockholder challenge to state action adversely affecting the
value of her shares may not necessarily survive other defenses based on

the Takings Clause,131 the conclusion that shares of stock at least
constitute property under the Clause is analytically correct. There seems

little doubt, for example, that if a state passed a statute appropriating all
of the stock its citizens held in a particular corporation without providing

for compensation, the ensuing inverse condemnation suit by stockholders
would survive any motion to dismiss advanced by the state based on the
premise that the shares were not "property." 139 Therefore, privatelyheld shares in a corporation are an appropriate subject for takings analysis.
132. E.g., United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 76 (1982). Justice
Rehnquist wrote:
The "bundle of rights" which accrues to a secured party is obviously smaller
than that which accrues to an owner in fee simple, but the Government cites
no cases supporting the proposition that differences such as these relegate the
secured party's interest to something less than property. And our decisions.
* militate against such a proposition.
Id. (citations omitted).
133. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
134. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
135. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
136. Id. at 222.
137. See id. at 223-28.
138. See infra notes 140-205 and accompanying text.
139. It is well settled that "[s]hares of stock constitute property distinct from the
capital or tangible property of the corporation, and belong to different owners." 18A
AM. JUR. 2D Corporations§ 432 (1985) (footnote omitted).

19941

WHOM MAY THE CORPORATION SERVE?

B. Regulation vs. Taking
The basis for the distinction in Takings-Clause jurisprudence between
a "taking," which requires compensation by the government," 4 and
mere "regulation," which does not, 141 originates in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon." In that case, the Court used the Takings Clause to
invalidate an application of a Pennsylvania statute that prohibited coal
mining in such a way as to threaten the foundations of human
habitations.'" Because the defendant had conveyed a parcel of land to
the plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest subject to an explicit right to mine
coal from the property in just such a way, 1" the statute destroyed a
previously existing property right and was invalid as applied to the
defendant. 145 Acknowledging the states' power to regulate various
interests entailed by property ownership, 1" the Court nonetheless noted
that if such an exercise of the police power could qualify the Takings
Clause without limit, "the natural tendency of human nature [would be]
to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property
disappears.... [W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 147
There are at least two categories of regulation that warrant being
deemed "takings" without regard to the public interest involved. Physical
occupation of property, for example, is compensable no matter how slight
the intrusion or how compelling the public purpose."' In addition,
when the state, through regulation, deprives a landowner of all
economically beneficial or productive uses of his property, compensation
is mandated."" In either of these two cases, the regulation amounts to
140. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (Holmes, J.)
("When [the limitation on the right to enjoy property represented by exercise of the
state's police power] reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must
be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.").
141. See id. ("Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law.").
142. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
143. See id. at 412-14.
144. Id. at 412-13.
145. Id. at 414.
146. See id. at 415.
147. Id.
148. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992) (citing
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).
149. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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a taking per se, obviating any inquiry into the regulation's purported
purposes."
Constituency statutes would probably not fall within either of the two
categories of regulation that constitute takings per se. The first category
is irrelevant to constituency statutes."' Furthermore, with regard to the
second category, the Court has stated that the regulation will not rise to
the level of a taking per se unless all economically viable use is
thwarted."
At times, the Court has gone to great lengths to find that
a regulation falls short of depriving the owner of all economically viable
use. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,' for
example, the Court upheld a municipal ordinance which effectively
forbade the owners of Grand Central Terminal from exercising their air
rights to build an edifice over the terminal," on the grounds that the air
rights were only part, albeit the most valuable part, of the rights
associated with the terminal. 55
Constituency statutes do not deprive a corporation's owners of all the
economic value of their shares. 56 Even the more stringent Indiana-style
statute, which states that directors need not give stockholders preferred
status in corporate decision-making, 57 do not require that the
corporation not generate profits. They do not, therefore, strip the
stockholder of the entire value that accrues to her from owning the stock.
Thus, viewed against the background discussed above, the statutes do not
amount to a taking per se.
150. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
151. Cf. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986)
(noting that regulation imposing liability on employer for pension fund withdrawals does
not physically invade or permanently appropriate any of the employer's assets).
152. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893; see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834; Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
153. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
154. See id. at 108-15.
155. See id. at 136-37.
156. By their terms, the statutes do not even purport to deprive stockholders of
economic value. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text. Nor, in their effect, do
the statutes eliminate stockholder value. If they had such an effect, markets would value
the shares in corporations chartered in states with constituency statutes at zero-an
outcome which, plainly, has not happened.
157. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(f).
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Apart from situations amounting to takings per se, the distinction
between regulation and taking is fact-specific.15 In its Takings-Clause
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has abstained from a rigid analysis, and
has preferred to evaluate on a case-by-case basis the particular

circumstances involved. 1 9

Nevertheless, two factors have been

identified as dominant in such an inquiry." These are: (1) whether the
regulation denies an owner economically viable use of property,
particularly when it interferes with distinct, investment-backed
expectations;. 6' and (2) whether the regulation advances legitimate state
interests.162
1. Investment-Backed Expectations
Whether constituency statutes interfere with "reasonable investmentbacked expectations" of stockholders is a difficult question. In permitting
or requiring consideration of non-stockholder constituencies, the statutes
alter the traditional understanding that stockholders are the sole
beneficiaries of the corporate enterprise. '6 What must be analyzed,
however, is whether that "traditional" understanding rises to the level of

a "reasonable expectation." The answer is a function of state law."
158. See Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124; see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (Holmes, J.) ("Government could hardly go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law. . . . One fact for consideration in determining [the
appropriate] limits is the extent of the diminution ....
So the question [whether there
is a taking] depends upon the particular facts.").
159. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2893 (1992) (citing
Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124).
160. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485
(1987) (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) and Penn Central,
438 U.S. at 124).
161. Id.
162. Id. This formulation applies to land use regulation, but it substantially mirrors
formulations the Court has used in analyzing non-real property regulations. See, e.g.,
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986).
163. See supranote 13 and accompanying text.
164. Corporate law is fundamentally state law. Cortv. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)
("Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit funds to corporate
directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal
affairs of the corporation."). See also Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7:
The answer to this difficult question [i.e., how to determine the extent of
deprivation for purposes of deciding when regulation has amounted to a taking]
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State incorporation statutes traditionally have been silent on the subject

of maximizing profits or stockholder wealth. 16 In fact, these laws have

not provided that corporate directors have duties to stockholders as
such. 1"

The Revised Model Business Corporation Act167 tracks the

language of many state statutes in specifying that "[a] director shall
discharge his duties as a director . . . in a manner he reasonably believes
to be in the best interests of the corporation.""s Furthermore, when
stockholders sue corporate directors for breaches of fiduciary duties, the
suit is often not instituted in stockholders' individual capacities, but on
behalf of the corporation, in a so-called "derivative" suit.1" For these
reasons, stockholder challenges to constituency statutes cannot rely on
statutory law for proof of a "reasonable expectation.""170
may lie in how the owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the
State's law of property-i.e., whether and to what degree the State's law has
accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest in land with
respect to which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in ... value.
Id.
165. CLARK, supranote 13, at 678.
166. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(1) (West 1993) ("A director shall
discharge his duties as a director... [i]n a manner he reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation.")(emphasis added); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(1)
(West 1985) ("A director shall discharge the duties of the position of director... in a
manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.
. . .") (emphasis added); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West Supp. 1994) ("In
discharging his duties to the corporation and in determining what he reasonably believes
to be in the best interests of the corporation,a director may [consider both stockholders'
and nonstockholders' interests].") (emphasis added); OHio REV. CODE ANN. §
1701.59(B) (Anderson 1986) ("A director shall perform his duties as a director ... in
a manner he reasonably believes to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation.. . .") (emphasis added).
167. REv. MODEL BusiNEss CORP. ACT (1991).
168. Id. § 8.30(a) (emphasis added).
169. See George D. Homstein, The Shareholder'sDerivative Suit in the United
States, 1967 J. Bus. L. 282, 285-86 (1967).
170. See American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations, § 2.01 (1992):
(a) [A] corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.
(b) Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced,
the corporation, in the conduct of its business:
(3) may devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare,
humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.
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Nor can stockholders opposing constituency statutes point to state case
law for proof of a reasonable expectation that they should be uniquely
favored in the corporate hierarchy. It has long been held, for example,
that corporations may make charitable contributions despite stockholder
complaints that such actions needlessly dissipate corporate assets."7
And, while certain cases contain strong language in favor of stockholder
primacy, 7 2 many more state that, in looking out for the best interests of
the corporation, directors may consider the interests of other groups. In
Shlensky v. Wrigley, for example, an Illinois appellate court affirmed
the dismissal of a derivative suit against the owner of the Chicago Cubs
which alleged that the directors' failure to approve the installation of lights
and the scheduling of night games at Wrigley Field constituted the breach
of a fiduciary duty in view of the potential profitability of night
baseball.' 4
The possible detrimental effect on the surrounding
neighborhood and ensuing diminution in the property value of Wrigley

Field were found to be legitimate long-term corporate interests justifying
the policy.'7

Furthermore,

in

Sylvia

Martin Foundation v.

Id. The Comment to this section elaborates that the economic objective of the
corporation is qualified by provisions which "reflect a recognition that the corporation
is a social as well as an economic institution, and accordingly that its pursuit of the
economic objective must be constrained by social imperatives and may be qualified by
social needs." Id. § 2.01
171. See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (N.J. 1953)
("[M]odem conditions requirethat corporations acknowledge and discharge social as well
as private responsibilities as members of the community within which they operate."),
appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953).
172. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)
(holding that Henry Ford breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation by withholding
dividends from shareholders in favor of lowering prices on cars). The court explained:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of
the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.
The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain
that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of
profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to
devote them to other purposes.
Id; see also Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of Am., 224 A.2d 634, 642 (Pa. 1966)
(reasoning that directors are not trustees but do occupy such fiduciary relations as to
imperatively demand that they manage the corporation's business so as to promote the
common interests of all stockholders).
173. 237 N.E.2d 776 (III. App. Ct. 1968).
174. Id. at 781.
175. Id. at 780.
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Swearingen,76 a federal court, applying state law, found in dictum that
the defendant directors were justified in avoiding cheap American loans
in favor of more expensive European loans-to the detriment
of the
17
corporation's profits-as "a matter of business judgment."
Wrigley and Sylvia Martin are not exceptional cases. Recent cases
decided in Delaware (whose statutory and judicial treatment of
corporations provides a standard for the other states178) echo this theme.
For example, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,179 the Supreme
Court of Delaware examined the issue of when corporate directors' efforts
to defeat hostile takeover bids could be afforded the protection of the
business judgment rule."s The court found that the business judgment
rule could be invoked if: (1) the directors had reasonable grounds for
believing that the takeover bid posed a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness,' and (2) their tactics were reasonable in relation to the
threat posed."
The court went on to state that reasonable defensive
measures
entail[] an analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover
bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise. Examples of such
concerns may include: inadequacy of the price offered, nature and
timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on
'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors,
customers, employees, and perhaps even the community
176. 260 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
177. Id. at 235.
178. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation
Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 280 (1985).
179. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
180. See id. at 953-58. The business judgment rule is a presumption operating in
favor of corporate directors who are faced with a stockholder suit alleging a breach of
the directors' duty of care. It is a
'presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company.' . - . Thus, the party
attacking a board decision as uninformed must rebut the presumption that its
business judgment was an informed one.
Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
181. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
182. Id.
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generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of
securities being offered in the exchange.ls"
The court thus explicitly recognized the appropriateness of considering
non-stockholder constituencies. Moreover, the language in which it did
so is revealing. While the court cited Guth v. Loft, Inc.'" approvingly
for the proposition that "corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act
in the best interests of the corporation's stockholders,""s its own
formulation of the directorial duty was considerably broader. The court
three times referred to directors' fiduciary duty to protect from perceived
threats, not the stockholders, but the "corporate enterprise,"186 thus
reinforcing the regard it showed for non-stockholder constituencies. "7
For similar reasons, constituency statutes that authorize directors to
consider the corporation's long-term interests do not conflict with existing
law. In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. ,18for example,
the Supreme Court of Delaware applied the Unocal test to the actions of
the directors of Time Inc. in resisting a hostile bid from Paramount
Communications, Inc." 9
The court found that Time's defensive
acquisition of Warner Communication, Inc. was a reasonable response to
the threat that Paramount posed to Time's carefully deliberated plan to
merge with Warner." In so doing, the court made clear that Time's
long-term "strategic objectives""' were worthy of protection, and
stated: "Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived
183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
185. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (emphasis added).
186. Id. at 954, 955, 958.
187. Of course, Unocal cannot be read to endorse consideration for nonstockholder
constituencies in all-or even in all takeover-contexts. When a takeover bid has
succeeded in making the corporation's sale inevitable, directors have a single duty-to
maximize existing stockholders' immediate value. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). In such a context, there is no
"long term," and there are no other constituencies to consider. TW Serv., Inc. v. SWT
Acquisition Corp., Civ. A. Nos. 10427 & 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar.
2, 1989); 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1169, 1187 (1989). A summary of the TWServs. opinion
appears at 57 U.S.L.W. 2535 (Mar. 21, 1989).
188. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
189. See id. at 1151-55.
190. See id. at 1155.
191. Id. at 1152.
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corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly
no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.""
Cases such as Wrigley, Sylvia Martin, Unocal, and Paramountsuggest
that New York-style constituency statutes,1 " which provide that
directors may consider both the long-term interests of the corporation and
the impact of its activities on employees and the community, comport with
existing understandings of the nature of the corporate enterprise.
Therefore, New York-style constituency statutes do not alter stockholders'
reasonable expectations regarding the favor they would receive from
directors.
Statutes such as Indiana's,1 9" which allow directors to place
stockholders on par with any other group (such that, in theory, even a
connection between a proposed corporate action and the stockholder's
long-term interests need not be proven), do present something of a novel
understanding of the relationship among constituencies. Courts, however,
would be unlikely to hold that such statutes violated stockholder
expectations. The courts might point to the states' reserved power to
amend their corporation laws at will," 9 and find that these reservedpower provisions formed as much a part of stockholders' expectations as
any other provision. 9" Or, more likely, the courts would read Indianastyle statutes narrowly, and conclude that because the statutes do not
require directors to place other constituencies on an equal footing with
stockholders, a stockholder-plaintiff would have to prove that defendantdirectors had actually disfavored stockholders-and thereby caused a
97
diminution in the economic value of his shares-in order to prevail.
192. Id. at 1154 (emphasis added).
193. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
194. See supranotes 25-27 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN" tit. 8, § 394 (1991) ("This chapter may be
amended or repealed, at the pleasure of the General Assembly .... ").
196. See Lyman Johnson, Sovereignty over CorporateStock, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L.
485, 521 n.175 (1991) (arguing that reserved-power provisions in the corporation laws
of the states would frustrate any Takings-Clause-based challenge); C. Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226-27 (1986) (reasoning that legislation
that increased employers' liability for withdrawals from pension funds did not interfere
with investment-backed expectations because pension plans were heavily regulated and
employers were on notice that additional financial obligations might be imposed).
197. The Supreme Court has made clear that, particularly in the context of the
Takings Clause, the constitutionality of statutes should not be decided in the context of
facial challenges, but should be decided only in the actual factual setting that makes such
a decision necessary. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264; 294-95 (1981). Thus, because it is far from certain that mere enactment of an
Indiana-style statute would deprive stockholders of economic value, a stockholder-
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Thus, with the possible exception of Indiana-style statutes (which would
present their own "uphill battle[s]"19 ' for plaintiffs), constituency
statutes do not interfere with stockholders' reasonable expectations
concerning directorial behavior.

2. Legitimate State Interests
Even if constituency statutes were found neither to interfere with
stockholders' reasonable expectations nor to deprive them of economic
value," 9 the statutes might nonetheless constitute a taking if they were
found not to advance legitimate state interests.200 A state-interest
analysis, in turn, depends on whether the statutes benefit the public or

merely redistribute benefits and burdens among private parties.201

The Court has indicated that regulation which has the primary
purpose of redistributing benefits and burdens among private parties is
suspect under the Takings Clause.'
On the other hand, legislation
which reallocates benefits and burdens among private parties, but which
plaintiff would have to show that she was actually harmed by the decisions of directors
acting pursuant to the statute, and that such harm exceeded that which she might
reasonably have expected to suffer in the absence of the statute. Because directors may
already serve the interests of other constituencies in promoting the corporation's longterm interests, this means that the plaintiff would have to prove that the directors had
actually disfavored stockholders' interests.
198. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987).
199. See supra notes 165-98 and accompanying text.
200. The Supreme Court has been unclear whether a taking occurs either when
economic use is denied or when legitimate interests have not been advanced-or whether
a taking occurs only when both economic use has been denied and legitimate interests
have not been advanced. CompareAgins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)
(regulation can effect a taking if it "does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests, . . . or [if it] denies an owner economically viable use of his land") with
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492-93 (implying that a finding of a legitimate state interest would
have been sufficient to defeat Takings Clause-based claim even absent a showing that
petitioner had not been denied economic use). In any event, both issues need to be
analyzed.
201. See Keystone, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). In Keystone, which concerned a facial
challenge to a statute similar to the one involved in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922), the Court distinguished the earlier statute as having been enacted
solely for the benefit of private parties and found that the new statute "plainly" sought
to further a public interest. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492.
202. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413-14 (holding that state statute
prohibiting subsurfacemining which threatened human habitations was specifically aimed
at reallocating burdens between coal companies and fee owners who had waived their
rights to subsurface support).
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is nonetheless intended to achieve a public purpose, will not amount to a
taking.t Generally, interference with property rights that arises from a
public program that adjusts economic benefits and burdens to promote the

common good does not constitute a taking.'
On this view,
constituency statutes would not be suspect. Whether they are conceived
as directly aimed at the public good, or as redistributing benefits among
stockholders and other constituencies in service of the public good, the
statutes are part of a broad trend toward promoting the well-being of
various groups in society. Here, as elsewhere, courts considering the
purposes of the statutes would be likely to accord substantial deference to
legislative determinations of the ends to be achieved by the statutes. 5
VI.

CONCLUSION

The premise with which this note began, that stockholders may
rightfully expect to lay exclusive claim to the fruits of the corporate
enterprise,
becomes questionable on closer inspection.'
States,
through both their corporation statutes and their case law, empower
corporate directors to have some regard for non-stockholder
constituencies." °s
This has important ramifications for the
constitutionality of constituency statutes. First, it suggests that the statutes

would not impair the existing stockholder-corporation contract.'
203. Connollyv. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,225 (1986). See also
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), in which the Court stated:
The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is transferred
in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as
having only a private purpose. The Court long ago rejected any literal
requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general public.
"It is not essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable
portion .... directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in order [for it]
to constitute a public use."
Id. at 243-44 (quoting Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923))
(alteration in original).
204. See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225.
205. See, e.g., Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 ("[Ihe Court has made clear that it will
not substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a public use
'unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.') (quoting United States v.
Gettysburg Elee. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
206. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 163-98 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 163-98 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
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While the relationship between stockholders, directors, and the corporation
might well be properly characterized as a contract, 210 the adverse impact
constituency statutes have on that contract, both formally and empirically,
would be minimal. 21' For this reason, especially given the relaxed
scrutiny that would probably be applied to a Contracts Clause-based
challenge, 2 courts would probably credit the public purposes
behind the
213
statutes, and the statutes would withstand the challenge.
Second, directors' existing license to serve the interests of groups
other than stockholders indicates that constituency statutes, rather than
upsetting the investment-backed expectations of stockholders that would
figure so prominently in a Takings Clause-based challenge,214 merely
formalize what has hitherto been only implicit in state law.2"5 Thus,
while the interests of stockholders in the corporation's assets, represented
by their holdings of stock, would constitute property under the Takings
Clause,21 6 constituency statutes would be found not to upset
stockholders' investment-backed expectations, especially in view of the
legitimate state interests which the statutes serve.21 7
Commentators will doubtless continue to debate the wisdom of
constituency statutes. Absent wholesale changes in the existing contours
of the Supreme Court's Contracts-Clause and Takings-Clause
jurisprudence, however, the federal Constitution will prove at best an
unsteady fulcrum from which to attempt to dislodge such statutes. Whom
the corporation should serve is an evergreen question, invoking all of
society's values, whether or not embodied in the Constitution; whom it
may serve-at least as respects the Constitution-is not.
Al Myers

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes

84-93 and accompanying text.
94-102 and accompanying text.
102-13 and accompanying text.
114-16 and accompanying text.
163-98 and accompanying text.
165-92 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.

